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BRADY AND JAILHOUSE INFORMANTS:
RESPONDING TO INJUSTICE
Peter A. Joyt
Two well-known mystery writers, Michael Connelly and John
Grisham, recently wrote books in which uncorroborated jailhouse
informant (snitch) testimony figures prominently. In Connelly's book,
The Lincoln Lawyer,' an ambitious young prosecutor uses fabricated
jailhouse snitch testimony to prosecute a man who is factually guilty.
In Grisham's book, The Innocent Man,2 an ambitious young
prosecutor uses fabricated jailhouse snitch testimony to prosecute a
man who is factually innocent. The Lincoln Lawyer, in which defense
counsel exposes the false snitch testimony at trial and wins acquittal
of a guilty man, is a work of fiction. The Innocent Man, in which the
false snitch testimony helps to convict an innocent man, is a work of
nonfiction. In both books, the prosecutors not only use false snitch
testimony, they also conceal exculpatory evidence required to be
disclosed to the accused by both Brady v. Maryland and prevailing
ethical rules.4 Both books help to illustrate how jailhouse snitch
t Professor of Law and Director of the Criminal Justice Clinic, Washington University
School of Law in St. Louis.
I MICHAEL CONNELLY, THE LINCOLN LAWYER (2005).
2 JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN (2006).
3 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to
an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecutor."). Since Brady, the
Supreme Court has decided a number of cases that have helped to define the disclosure
obligation. Prosecutors must disclose materials that could impeach a witness' credibility, such
as plea agreements with witnesses or other incentives to testify. Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150 (1972); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). In addition, a promise made by
one prosecutor to a witness is imputed to the trial prosecutor, Giglio 405 U.S. at 154, and the
trial prosecutor has an obligation to learn of Brady material known to other prosecutors in the
office or to the police. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) ("[T]he individual prosecutor
has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's
behalf in the case, including the police.").
4 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2006) [hereinafter MODEL
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testimony and Brady violations sidetrack procedural justice, and
Grisham's first book of nonfiction demonstrates how snitch testimony
and Brady violations can combine to deny substantive justice by
convicting the innocent. In this article, I analyze the pervasiveness of
false snitch testimony and Brady violations as contributing causes of
wrongful convictions and I recommend concrete steps that head
prosecutors, defense lawyers, and trial and appellate judges can take
to prevent and to respond effectively to these causes of wrongful
convictions.
Throughout this article, I use the pejorative term "snitch" rather
than "informant" due to the high rate of unreliability of
uncorroborated jailhouse informant testimony. The untrustworthiness
of such witnesses is well documented, and even some prosecutors
who use jailhouse informants refer to them as "snitches." The
pernicious effects of snitch testimony, especially when combined with
a prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory information to the
defense as required by Brady, are illustrated in Ron Williamson's
case.
Ron Williamson, the subject of Grisham's book The Innocent
Man, spent twelve years on Oklahoma's death row for a crime he did
not commit before DNA evidence exonerated him. The prosecutor
waited until after the death of Williamson's mother, a well respected
member of the community and Williamson's alibi witness, 5 before
bringing charges against Williamson.6 The prosecutor then built his
RULES]. The ethical rule states:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall... (d) make timely disclosure to the defense
of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt
of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose
to the defendant and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to
the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a
protective order of a tribunal; ....
Id.
The American Bar Association (ABA) adopted the Model Rules in 1983 and has amended
them frequently, most recently in 2002. The Model Rules replaced the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility (Model Code), which the ABA adopted in 1969. Nearly every state
and the District of Columbia have adopted most of the language of the Model Rules for their
ethics rules. See STEPHEN GILLERS & RoY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES
AND STANDARDS 3 (2006).
5 Juanita Williamson was well known and respected in the community as a devout
Christian, and "[s]he had hundreds of customers at her beauty shop and treated them all like
close friends. If Juanita took the witness stand and said Ronnie was home on the night of the
murder, the jury would believe her." GRISHAM, supra note 2, at 105. In addition, Juanita
Williamson had an entry in her diary stating that Williamson was home with her and a receipt
from a video store for the movies that she watched with Williamson the night of the murder
"until early the next morning." Id. at 104-05.
6 See id. at 121-23, 133.
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case around the uncorroborated testimony of a jailhouse snitch with
three prior felony convictions who, while facing more charges,
claimed that two years earlier she overheard a jailhouse phone call in
which Williamson admitted to committing murder.7 Next, the
prosecutor and police withheld exculpatory evidence, including the
video of a polygraph of Williamson, administered shortly after the
murder in which Williamson denied any involvement, and a report of
a video of an interview with Williamson's mother taken shortly
before her death in which Williamson's mother provided evidence
that she was with Williamson at her home the night of the murder.9
Stories like Williamson's are hard to align with the concept of
justice in the United States. Yet, hardly a month goes by when there is
not news about some other defendant who, after a lengthy
incarceration, is exonerated based on DNA evidence. Since the first
post-conviction DNA exoneration in 1989, there have been 194 post-
conviction DNA exonerations in the United States, and those
wrongfully convicted spent an average of twelve years in prison
before being set free.1° Combined, this represents more than two
millennia-2,328 years--of confining the innocent in prison. Not
only does this represent the loss of potentially productive lives for
those convicted, but it also represents over $52 million in taxpayer
money spent on state prison costs for the wrongfully convicted,
unknown expenditures for prosecuting, defending and providing trials
that convict the wrong people,' 2 and an indeterminate amount of tax
dollars paid to the wrongfully convicted as reparations either
7 The witness, Terri Holland, claimed that she heard Williamson make a full confession
over the phone in the front office of the jail, even though the jail personnel working the front
desk never reported hearing anything inculpatory. See GRISHAM, supra note 2, at 152-53; see
also Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F.Supp. 1529, 1950-51 (E.D. Oki. 1995) affd, 110 F.3d 1508
(10th 1997) (commenting on the "troubling aspect" of Terri Holland's motivation to testify
against Williamson).
8 See GRISHAM, supra note 2, at 194-95,277.
9 See id. at 105-06. A detective asked Juanita Williamson if he could videotape a
statement, and he asked her questions while she faced a video camera. Neither the tape nor a
report of the interview was ever produced. See id.
10 Innocence Project, Fact Sheet, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/351 PRINT.
php (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
"1 "The average annual operating cost per State inmate in 2001 was $22,650, or $62.05
per day." James J. Stephen, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, State Prison
Expenditures, 2001, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/spe0l.pdf
Based on prison costs in 2001, the state prison costs for 2328 years of imprisonment are
$52,729,200, using the average cost per year of imprisonment of $22,650. Grisham estimates
that the cost to imprison Williamson, excluding extra cost of death row and treatment in state
mental hospitals, "was at least $250,000." GRISHAM, supra note 2, at 357.
12 There are no accurate estimates or data on the defense and prosecution costs for those
wrongfully convicted, nor are there data on the proportionate costs for the judges, juries, court
personnel, and jailers involved in wrongful convictions.
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voluntarily, by statute, or as a result of litigation settlements and
judgments. 13
In addition to the loss of liberty and the costs of convicting the
innocent, there are three additional dimensions to wrongful
convictions that are sometimes neglected. First, more than half of
those exonerated by DNA-1 12 of 194-are African American, 14 a
rate higher than the racial disparities in arrests and convictions. 5
Commentators note that this racial disparity is likely the result of one
of the causes of wrongful convictions, cross-racial
misidentifications,1 6 and "subtle problems of racism and stereotyping
on the part of jurors, judges, prosecutors and defense lawyers.' 17
Second, while the innocent are convicted and confined in prison, the
guilty persons are often free to commit more crimes. 18 Third, the
DNA exonerations represent a fraction of the wrongfully convicted
because there is no DNA evidence in most cases. For example, one
study identified 196 additional persons who had been exonerated by
13 There is no uniform method for compensating the wrongfully convicted. Approximately
two thirds of the states do not have compensation or indemnification statutes. See Adele
Bernhard, Table: When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 345 (2000). In some instances, private bills are enacted to provide relief in
particular cases. See Adele Bernhard, Justice Still Fails: A Review of Recent Efforts to
Compensate Individuals Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later Exonerated, 52 DRAKE
L. REV. 703, 709 (2004). When successful, law suits can yield generous compensation. For
example, the local government that convicted Williamson paid over $500,000 and the total
settlement for wrongfully convicting Williamson was "believed to be in the $5 million range."
GRISHAM, supra note 2, at 343. However, compensation is difficult to obtain through litigation,
because prosecutors and law enforcement officers are usually protected from lawsuits by
governmental immunity. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410 (1976) (holding that a state
prosecutor acting within the scope of prosecutorial duties may not be sued); Hunter v. Bryant,
502 U.S. 224, 229 (holding that law enforcement officers are entitled to immunity). In
Williamson's case, he overcame claims of immunity by demonstrating that the prosecutor
stepped out of his role as prosecutor to run the criminal investigation, and there was sufficient
evidence demonstrating that a genuine question of fact existed as to whether prosecutor and
police engaged in fabrication of evidence and withheld exculpatory evidence to convict
Williamson. See GRISHAM, supra note 2, at 341-42.
14 See Innocence Project, supra note 10.
15 African Americans comprise 57.7 percent of those exonerated by DNA evidence. See
id. In 1999, African Americans were approximately 12.9 percent of the population but were
49.4 percent of those in jails and prisons. Karen F. Parker et al., Racial Bias and the Conviction
of the Innocent, in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 114, 114-15
(Saundra D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey eds., 2001); see also id. at 116-18 (discussing
racial disparities in four major studies of wrongful convictions).
16 See Parker et al., supra note 15, at 121-22.
17 Daniel S. Medwed, Anatomy of a Wrongful Conviction: Theoretical Implications and
Practical Solutions, 51 VILL. L. REV. 337, 375-76 (2006).
18 See, e.g., Cynthia E. Jones, Evidence Destroyed, Innocence Lost: The Preservation of
Biological Evidence Under Innocence Protection Statutes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1239, 1267
n. 133 (2005) (citing several examples of where the actual perpetrators were free to commit
additional crimes while wrongfully convicted were imprisoned). "The true suspects and/or
perpetrators have been identified in more than a third of the DNA exoneration cases." See
Innocence Project, supra note 10.
RESPONDING TO INJUSTICE
means other than DNA evidence from 1989 through 2003.19 The
authors of this more comprehensive study acknowledge that their list
of exonerations is not exhaustive because of the lack of a national
registry of exonerations and fragmented record keeping at the local,
state, and federal levels.20 The researchers also exclude from their
study mass exonerations, such as the 100 to 150 defendants convicted
on the basis of police pejury in Los Angeles as part of the Rampart
scandal.21 After compiling the data on exonerations, the researchers of
this more expansive study conclude "that many defendants who are
not on this list, no doubt thousands, have been falsely convicted of
serious crimes but have not been exonerated.,
22
Although it may not be possible to estimate accurately the number
of wrongfully convicted, whatever the number, the most obvious
question for anyone interested in justice is: What steps can be taken to
address the underlying causes of wrongful convictions? Even those
who may view the number of wrongful convictions as insignificant in
light of the large number of persons convicted each year should be
interested in taking steps to limit wrongful convictions if they care
about procedural and substantive justice. 23 As a result of this interest
in improving the criminal justice system, there have been a number of
books, dozens of law review articles, a host of law school symposia,
such as the one held by Case Western Reserve Law Review, and other
efforts exploring the issue of wrongful convictions.
19 See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonercations in the United States 1989 through 2003, 95 J.
CiuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 523-24 (2005). In this study, the authors use "exoneration"
whenever there "is an official act declaring a defendant not guilty of a crime for which he or she
had previously been convicted." Id. at 524. The methods of exoneration included pardons based
on evidence of innocence, court dismissal of charges based on new evidence of innocence,
acquittals at a retrial on the basis of evidence that the accused had no role in the crimes for
which they had been originally convicted, and posthumous acknowledgements of innocence by
state governments. See id. Given this broader definition of "exoneration," the authors state that
"we are in no position to reach an independent judgment on the factual innocence of each
defendant in our data." Id. at 526. Justice Antonin Scalia is critical of this study for "its inflation
of the word 'exoneration' . . . mischaracterization of reversible error as actual innocence."
Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S.Ct. 2516, 2537 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring). In response to an op-ed
critical of the study, one of the authors notes that a DNA review of rape convictions in Virginia
demonstrated that one in fourteen rape convictions were wrongful. Samuel R. Gross, Letter to
the Editor, False Convictions Study, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006, Sec. 4, at 11.
20 Gross et. al., supra note 19, at 525.
21 Id. at 533-34.
22 Id. at 527.
23 Joshua Marquis, while a district attorney in Oregon and Vice President of the National
District Attorneys Association, wrote an op-ed critical of the attention given to cases of the
wrongfully convicted. Joshua Marquis, Op-Ed, The Innocent and the Shammed, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 2006, at A23. He notes that given the large number of felony convictions each year, the
error rate is very small, perhaps less than one percent. See id. Still, he notes, "American justice
is a work in progress, and those of us charged with administering it are well aware that it needs
constant improvement." Id.
20071
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Among the efforts considering how to address the causes of
wrongful convictions is the work of the Ad Hoc Innocence
Committee of the American Bar Association (ABA) Criminal Justice
Section. The Ad Hoc Innocence Committee studied many of the
causes of wrongful conviction and issued a report directed at systemic
reforms-including reforms addressing snitch testimony and
prosecutorial practices.24 Professor Paul Giannelli wrote portions of
the report dealing with jailhouse snitches, 25 and the committee
recommended a resolution, which the ABA House of Delegates
passed, urging federal, state, and local governments to adopt
measures so "no prosecution should occur based solely upon the
uncorroborated jailhouse informant testimony. 26 With regard to
prosecutorial practices directed at Brady disclosures, the committee
recommended, and the ABA House of Delegates passed, a resolution
that advocates federal, state and local governments to implement
procedures so that law enforcement agencies and others working with
prosecutors have a better understanding of their obligation to disclose
exculpatory and mitigating evidence to prosecutors.27
The reforms the Ad Hoc Innocence Committee and ABA House of
Delegates recommend are laudable and should be pursued. If
implemented, these systemic reforms will go a long way toward
ensuring more procedural and substantive justice. But systemic
reforms take time and may be less likely to occur than the pragmatic
measures I urge local prosecutors, defense lawyers, and individual
judges to start taking immediately to respond to the injustice of false
snitch testimony and Brady violations that contribute to wrongful
convictions.
I begin with a short discussion of the problem of wrongful
convictions and the roles that false snitch testimony and prosecutorial
misconduct play in convicting the innocent in Part I. In order to shape
effective remedies to prevent wrongful convictions, it is necessary to
understand the scope of the problem and the nature of causes of
wrongful convictions. In Part II, I outline a number of realistic
measures that head prosecutors, trial and appellate judges, and
defense lawyer should take to prevent false snitch testimony and
Brady violations. My goal in outlining these practical, low cost or no-
24 REPORT OF THE ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION'S AD HOC INNOCENCE COMMITTEE
TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE
INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY (Paul C. Giannelli & Myrna Raeder eds., 2006)
[hereinafter INNOCENCE COMMITTEE REPORT].
25 See Paul C. Giannelli, Brady and Jailhouse Snitches, 57 CASE W. RES. L. R. 593
(2007).
26 INNOCENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 24, at 63 & n. 1.
27 Id. at 99 &n. 1.
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cost recommendations to counter the prejudicial effects of snitch
testimony and Brady violations is to generate interest by the countless
good prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges who could prevent
wrongful convictions through their daily work.
I. WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
SNITCH TESTIMONY AND BRADY VIOLATIONS
Snitch testimony and prosecutorial misconduct, including failure
to disclose exculpatory evidence as required by Brady, are major
contributing causes to wrongful convictions. Fifty-one of the first
11 1 death row exonerations involved convictions based upon false
snitch testimony.28 Of the first sixty-two DNA exonerations, fifteen
cases involved snitch testimony and twenty-six cases involved
prosecutorial misconduct.29 Of the cases involving prosecutorial
misconduct, the suppression of exculpatory evidence-Brady
violations--occurred forty-three percent of the time.30
Some of the other factors leading to wrongful convictions, such as
mistaken identification, are more prevalent,31 but false snitch
testimony and suppression of exculpatory evidence are especially
troubling because both serve to derail the truth seeking process of the
criminal justice system. Rather than the adversarial process working
as intended,32 the use of false evidence (whether knowingly or
unintentionally by prosecutors) and the suppression of exculpatory
evidence either lead some innocent defendants to plead guilty or deny
the fact finders the ability to reach just verdicts in cases that go to
trial.
At the plea stage, efforts to eliminate false snitch testimony and to
guarantee the defendant access to exculpatory evidence are necessary
in order for there to be confidence in the accuracy of guilty pleas.
This is especially true because some innocent defendants plead guilty
in order to secure a certain shorter sentence or avoid the possibility of
a death sentence. There is no question that this type of risk benefit
28 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW CENTER ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS,
THE SNITCH SYSTEM: How SNITCH TESTIMONY SENT RANDY STEIDL AND OTHER INNOCENT
AMERICANS TO DEATH ROW 3 (2005), available at http://www.law.northwestem.edu/
wrongfulconvictions/documents/SnitchSystemBooklet.pdf.
29 JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE app. at 263
(2000).
30 Id. app. at 265.
31 Mistaken identity was found in fifty-two of the first sixty-two cases, serology inclusion
was found in thirty-two cases, and police misconduct in thirty-one cases. Id. at 263.
32 "The very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy
on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and
the innocent go free." Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975).
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analysis occurs, and our system of justice acknowledges the right of
an individual to maintain innocence while entering a plea of guilty.
33
The issue of false guilty pleas is accentuated by the extremely high
number of criminal cases resolved by guilty pleas. Government
studies show that ninety-five percent of state felony cases are
resolved through guilty pleas. 34 In the federal system, over ninety
percent of those facing felony charges were convicted and ninety-six
percent of those convictions rested on guilty pleas.35 These studies
confirm, and in some situations exceed, commentators' estimates of
guilty plea rates at approximately eighty to ninety percent.36
It is impossible to know how many defendants plead guilty to
avoid more serious sentences, but there are examples. Recently,
James Ochoa was exonerated by DNA evidence after serving ten
months in prison for a crime he did not commit. 37 James Ochoa
originally rejected a prosecutor's offer of two years in prison in
exchange for pleading guilty because he knew he was innocent. But,
after the trial judge threatened to impose a life sentence if convicted,
James Ochoa entered a guilty plea during his trial over the advice of
his defense lawyer rather than risk conviction.38 In another case,
Christopher Ochoa pled guilty to murder to avoid the possibility of
the death penalty; DNA testing exonerated him after he spent twelve
years in prison. 39 In the study of exonerations from 1989 to 2003, the
researchers found that six percent of the exonerees had pled guilty.
40
33 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (holding that a defendant may enter a
guilty plea while maintaining innocence in order to avoid a harsher punishment if found guilty
at trial).
34 A 2002 study of felony cases in the seventy-five largest counties found that ninety-five
percent of convictions occurring within a year of arrest were the result of guilty pleas. U.S.
Dep't Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Case Processing Statistics, available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cases.htm#felony. The study also found that approximately sixty-
eight percent of all state felony defendants were convicted, with an eighty percent conviction
rate for murder. Id.
35 In 2004, approximately ninety-two percent of defendants facing federal felony charges
were convicted, and ninety-six percent of those convicted pled guilty. U.S. Dep't Justice,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, 2004, at 59, available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/c fs0404.pdf.
36 "A crudely calculated number that many commentators take as an honest estimate is
80% to 90% dispositions by guilty plea." H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The
Obligation of Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit, 68 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1695, 1699 (2000).
37 See H.G. Reza, Innocent Man Grabs His Freedom and Leaves Town, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
2, 2006, at BI.
38 See id.
39 Innocence Project, Know the Cases. Christopher Ochoa, http://www.innocenceproject.
org/Content/230.php (last visited Feb. 1I, 2007). A less clear example is Curtis McGhee,
convicted of murder in 1978 on the basis of testimony from an alleged accomplice. McGee had
his conviction reversed in 2003 because law enforcement authorities withheld exculpatory
evidence. Rather than face a retrial, he pled guilty to second degree murder and was set free. See
Gross et al., supra note 19, at 537-38.
40 See Gross et al., supra note 19, at 536.
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In a more recent study, researchers documented fourteen false guilty
pleas out of 125 proven false confessions---eleven percent of their
sample.41
In these and other instances of false guilty pleas, some innocent
defendants plead guilty rather than face a harsher penalty, sometimes
the death penalty. Because most felony cases result in guilty verdicts,
and nearly all guilty verdicts are the result of defendants pleading
guilty, the use of false snitch testimony or withholding exculpatory
evidence become powerful levers to convince innocent persons that
the trial process is stacked against them. As the James Ochoa case
indicates, this can occur even over the advice of defense counsel.
These cases illustrate the importance of Brady disclosures to the
proper functioning of the guilty plea process.
In addition to guilty pleas where the defendants are insincere and
enter pleas to avoid the possibility of harsher punishment, Professor
Kevin McMunigal notes that without disclosure of exculpatory
information prior to a guilty plea there are problems of factually
inaccurate guilty pleas due to faulty assumptions on the part of
defendants.43 McMunigal points out that some defendants enter guilty
pleas because of their mistaken belief that they were guilty. A
defendant can be mistaken and have imperfect knowledge of events
when the prosecutor does not disclose exculpatory statements of
witnesses who know critical information that the defendant does
not,44 or when the prosecutor does not disclose investigatory reports,
41 Steven Drizin, Blum Blog: False Guilty Pleas: DNA Clears Man in Carjacking Case,
http://blog.law.northwestem.edu/bluhm/2006/l 1/false-guiltyjpl.html (last visited Feb. 18,
2007).
42 See supra notes 32 & 33 and accompanying text.
43 See generally Kevin C. McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady Disclosure, and Wrongful
Convictions, 57 CASE W. RES. L. R. 741 (2007).
44 One of the examples Professor McMunigal uses is State v. Gardner, 885 P.2d 1144
(Idaho Ct. App. 1994). Danny Gardner was charged with vehicular manslaughter as the result of
a collision when the automobile he was driving crossed the center line into the path of an
oncoming pick-up truck, killing the driver of the truck and seriously injuring three passengers in
the truck. Gardner tested positive for marijuana and his nephew, a passenger in Gardner's
automobile at the time of the accident, gave a statement that Gardner had smoked marijuana
right before the accident. See id. at 1147. Tests indicated that Gardner was under the influence
of marijuana and was sleep deprived. Gardner pled guilty, stating at the hearing that "he could
not remember anything about the accident and believed that he might have fallen asleep while
driving because he had not slept the previous night." Id. Unknown to Gardner at the time he
entered his plea was that a witness, traveling behind Gardner's vehicle at the time of the
accident, gave a written statement to the Idaho State Police that "when the blue car [Gardner's
vehicle] was about ten feet in front of the truck I believe the driver's front tire blew. The whole
[sic] jumped into the oncoming lane like it was on rails." Id. In a deposition given in a
subsequent civil case over the accident, "the witness further explained that he observed the left-
front tire blowing out. He saw a puff of dust and rock chunks that appeared to have been caused
by the tire blowing, and then the car immediately jerked to the left." Id. The trial court denied
Gardner's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, but the Idaho Court of Appeals vacated
2007]
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such as accident reconstruction reports, that withdraw initial
conclusions incorrectly blaming the defendant.45
False snitch testimony and Brady violations clash with the
generally accepted notion that our criminal justice system protects the
innocent and convicts the guilty. The presumption of innocence, 46 the
right to remain silent,47 the right to a public trial by an impartial
jury,48 and the requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt are all procedural safeguards meant to the protect the innocent.
These safeguards reinforce the public's belief that our criminal justice
system operates on the precautionary principle that "better that ten
guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer." 49 When false
testimony is introduced into evidence, or exculpatory evidence is
withheld from the defendant for possible use at trial, the justice
system is derailed.
In many ways, the prosecutor is the key actor in the criminal
justice system with both the overarching duty and the means to
Gardner's guilty plea finding that the Brady disclosure duty applies to guilty pleas and that the
prosecution's failure to disclose the written witness statement violated this duty. Id. at 1149-50,
52.
45 In Carroll v. State, 474 S.E.2d 737 (Ga.App. 1996), Jessica Carroll entered a guilty plea
based on the incorrect conclusions of an inexperienced investigating officer, who had not
completed his first course in accident reconstruction. The investigating officer's conclusions,
both about Carroll's speed and the role of road conditions in causing a accident that killed one
person, turned out to be unsupported by the evidence collected at the scene of the accident. In
preparing for trial, a more experienced accident reconstruction expert working for the state
advised the prosecutor that the speed could not be calculated and that "the newly paved highway
and the shoulder, which dropped-off, contributed to the accident." Id. at 738. The state did not
disclose this new information and Carroll entered a guilty plea. Id. at 739. On appeal, the
Georgia Court of Appeals granted Carroll's motion to withdraw her guilty plea, finding a Brady
violation, and remanded the case for trial. Id. at 739-40.
46 The U.S. Constitution does not expressly contain language about a presumption of
innocence, but this principle has long been held as fundamental to our criminal justice system.
See, e.g., Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) ("The principle that there is a
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and
elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal
law."); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) ("The presumption of innocence, although
not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of
criminal justice.").
47 "No person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
.U.S. CONST amend. V.
48 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury .... U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right to a trial by a jury of one's
peers has been described as "an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
49 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *358. Professor Alexander Volokb traces
the roots of the principle that some guilty should go free rather than risk punishing the innocent
to ancient Greek philosophy, early Roman commentary, and the Book of Genesis. See
Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 173, 177-78 n.27 (1997). By the early
1800s, courts in the United States began quoting Blackstone's maxim. See id. at 183-84.
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protect the innocent. As the Supreme Court explained, the prosecutor
"is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer., 50 Ethics rules reinforce this notion by requiring a prosecutor
to be a "minister of justice" and to seek justice.5 1 As a minister of
justice, the prosecutor has the responsibility "not simply . . . of an
advocate," but to adopt a somewhat neutral stance "to see that the
defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided
upon the basis of sufficient evidence. 52
The prosecutor's duty to seek justice may conflict with the
prevailing norm of zealous representation by lawyers in the United
States, however.5 3 The norm of zealous representation is deeply
rooted in the way that prosecutors approach their work, both
historically and ethically. Victims initiated and prosecuted their own
cases from colonial times until the mid-1800s in some states, 54 and
public prosecutors would sometimes hire private lawyers to assist
with prosecutions as late as the 1890s.55 Even today, many
prosecutors in the United States are part-time prosecutors who also
engage in private practice, sometimes doing criminal defense.56
50 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
5' MODEL RULES, supra note 4, at R. 3.8 cmt. 1.
52 Id.; see also United States v. Kalfayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that
prosecutors "serve truth and justice first" and their "job isn't just to win, but to win fairly,
staying well within the rules").
53 The concept of zealous representation is perhaps best captured by the words of Henry
Brougham in his defense of Queen Caroline before England's House of Lords in 1820.
Brougham threatened to take every step necessary to advance his client's interests, even if the
defense of Queen Caroline would cause damage to King George IV. He explained:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world,
and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at
all hazards and costs to other persons, and, among them, to himself, is his first and
only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the
destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from
that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of consequences, though it should be his
unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.
2 THE TRIAL AT LARGE OF HER MAJESTY CAROLINE AMELIA ELIZABETH 3 (London, T. Kelly
1821); see also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics § 10.3.1, at 580 (1986).
Zealous advocacy is typically discussed in many law schools courses, and it underlies our
justice system, which is based on a competitive rather than cooperative model. See Robert J.
Kutak, The Adversary System and the Practice of Law, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS'
ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHics 172, 173 (David Luban ed., 1984).
54 See Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of "Public" Prosecutors in
Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1309, 1322-26.
55 See Mike McConville & Chester Mirsky, The Rise of Guilty Pleas: New York, 1800-
1865, 22 J. L. & SOC'Y 443, 452-53 (1995).
56 In the late 1970s, a majority of prosecutors in the United States were part-time
prosecutors who also engaged in private practice that could include representing the accused.
See WOLFRAM, supra note 53, § 8.9.4, at 454-55. Part-time prosecutors may ethically represent
defendants provided the same office in which the part-time prosecutor works is not prosecuting
the defendant and the charges do not involve the same jurisdiction's laws that the part-time
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Prosecutors, whether part-time or full-time, receive the same legal
education and are governed by the same ethics rules-with only one
ethics rule directed solely to prosecutors-that apply to other lawyers.
In deciding whether to rely on jailhouse snitch testimony, the
prosecutor likely feels the possibly conflicting pull of the duty to do
justice against the norm of zealous representation. Jailhouse snitch
testimony is notoriously unreliable, with inmates often manufacturing
supposed confessions from others-such as the snitch in
Williamson's case-in return for lenient treatment or other benefit.57
Court decisions and former prosecutors warn about the danger of
jailhouse snitches who "purchase leniency from the government by
offering testimony in return for immunity, or in return for reduced
incarceration. 58 Yet, as in the Williamson's case, sometimes snitch
testimony is the key to prosecuting the person the prosecutor believes
is culpable. When the suspect is in fact innocent, either the prosecutor
is duped by the snitch or the prosecutor relies on what she may
suspect is manufactured testimony because such testimony is the
means to what the prosecutor believes is the desired ends of
convicting a defendant the prosecutor presumes to be factually guilty.
Similarly, the prosecutor is conflicted when determining what
material is exculpatory and must be given to the defendant pursuant to
Brady. Under Brady and most state criminal discovery rules, the
prosecutor has the discretion to determine what constitutes
exculpatory evidence and when to disclose it. This has led to
inconsistent decisions with some prosecutors turning over to
defendants material other prosecutors fail to disclose, and some
prosecutors waiting until the eve of trial or even during trial before
turning over material.59
prosecutor must enforce. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Informal
Op. 1285, at 160 (1974) (stating that prosecutors who only prosecute violations of municipal
ordinances may represent criminal defendants facing violations of state law provided the
municipality is not directly or indirectly involved or affected); Supreme Court of Ohio, Bd. of
Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 88-008 (1988), available at
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/BOC/AdvisoryOpinions/ (stating that a municipal prosecutor
may "represent a criminal defendant in cases not involving the city or its ordinances").
57 Professor Giannelli gives several examples, including Leslie Vernon White, who
testified against more than a dozen inmates and helped spark a special grand jury investigation
ofjailhouse informants. See Giannelli, supra note 25.
58 N. Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1123. The author of this decision, Judge
Stephen Trott, was a former prosecutor who wrote a law review article warning prosecutors to
be wary of using jailhouse snitches, co-conspirators, and other criminals as witnesses. See
Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 1381 (1996).
59 The prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence favorable to the defense is triggered when
the evidence is material. "[E]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that,
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The prosecutor makes these decisions secretly, usually based on
personal judgment, and those decisions are not subject to any
established oversight mechanisms. The decision making process first
requires the prosecutor to determine if the evidence is exculpatory
and then if it is "material." Under existing law, the prosecutor knows
that a Brady violation will not occur unless "there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different., 60 Essentially, this
means that the prosecutor who is convinced of the guilt of the accused
is placed in the conflicting position of deciding if there is evidence
strong enough to prevent a finding of guilt by the jury.
Even when Brady violations are found,6' the prosecutor knows that
there is little fear of professional discipline because, as one
commentator researching professional discipline against prosecutors
for Brady violations concluded, "punishment is virtually
nonexistent.,
62
Until systemic reforms, such as those the ABA Ad Hoc Innocence
Committee recommended, occur, the responsibility falls upon the
prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges at the trial and appellate
levels to take measures that curtail the use of false snitch testimony
and lead to better compliance with Brady disclosures. In the following
part of this article, I will briefly outline what can be done.
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the results of the proceeding would have been
different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). There is no specific rule
governing the timing of disclosures of exculpatory evidence, and a prosecutor need only
disclose "exculpatory and impeachment information no later than the point at which a
reasonable probability will exist that the outcome would have been different if an earlier
disclosure had been made." United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 2001); see also
United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281, 291 (7th Cir. 1979) ("As long as ultimate disclosure is
made before it is too late for the defendant[] to make use of any benefits of the evidence, Due
Process is satisfied."). "With neither a clear definition of favorable evidence nor a disclosure
timetable, prosecutors have interpreted the constitutional discovery obligation inconsistently,
and too often disclosed favorable information on the eve of, during, or after trial--or not at all."
Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, Proposed Codification of Disclosure of Favorable Information
Under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 and 16, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 93, 94 (2004).
60 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
61 When Brady violations do surface, they are usually found because of a freedom of
information act request, the information comes out in a related case, or the information comes
out after DNA testing. See Giannelli, supra note 25, at 693.
62 Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A
Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 742 (1987); see also BENNETT L. GERSHMAN,
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (2d ed. 2005) (discussing instances of prosecutorial misconduct
and the lack of effective remedies); Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The
Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 833 (1997) (finding the disciplinary process ineffective against prosecutors).
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II. ACTION PLAN FOR PROSECUTORS, DEFENSE ATTORNEYS, AND
JUDGES TO COMBAT FALSE SNITCH TESTIMONY AND BRADY
VIOLATIONS
Prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges at the trial and appellate
levels can and should do more to combat false snitch testimony and
Brady violations. The growing number of exonerations demonstrates
how snitch testimony and Brady violations can combine to convict
the innocent, and anyone interested in avoiding future wrongful
convictions should be interested in exploring what can be done
immediately, without waiting for the possible reforms discussed
above. Because prosecutors have the most control over snitch
testimony and the disclosure of Brady material, I begin by discussing
measures that head prosecutors should implement.
A. What Head Prosecutors Can Do
Commentators offer a number of reasons to explain why
prosecutors commit errors in judgment, such as failing to make
required Brady disclosures. Some commentators attribute fault to
prosecutors and contend that prosecutors make these errors to gain
advantage in the trial process or because they are overzealous.63 More
recently, other commentators have argued that faulty judgment is
more likely due to various unintentional cognitive biases that
prosecutors have rather than assessing blame against the
prosecutors.64 I have argued previously that prosecutorial misconduct
is likely the result of three institutional conditions: "vague ethics rules
that provide ambiguous guidance to prosecutors; vast discretionary
63 See, e.g., Kenneth Bresler, "I Never Lost a Trial": When Prosecutors Keep Score of
Criminal Convictions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537, 541 (1996) (arguing that a "win at all
costs" mentality by some prosecutors cause them to cut "ethical comers"); Bennett L.
Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 350 (2001)
(discussing the lack of "moral courage" among prosecutors); Judith L. Maute, "In Pursuit of
Justice" in High Profile Criminal Matters, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1745, 1747 (2002) (discussing
problems of "overzealous prosecutors"); Tracy L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior:
Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 851, 882-90 (1995) (discussing the correlation of the "desire to 'win' with prosecutorial
misconduct).
64 See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006) (arguing that confirmation bias,
selective information processing, belief perseverance, and avoidance of cognitive dissonance
impede prosecutor decision making); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple
Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WISCONSIN L. REV. 291 (analyzing how
tunnel vision-focusing on a particular suspect-affects all phases of criminal proceedings);
Dianne L. Martin, Lessons About Justice from the "Laboratory" of Wrongful Convictions:
Tunnel Vision, the Construction of Guilt and Informer Evidence, 70 UMKC L. REV. 847 (2002)
(exploring how tunnel vision leads to constructing guilt based on unreliable informants).
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authority with little or no transparency; and inadequate remedies for
prosecutorial misconduct, which create perverse incentives for
prosecutors to engage in, rather than refrain from, prosecutorial
misconduct., 65 Whether the use of false snitch testimony and Brady
violations are largely the result of conscious actions, unconscious
psychological motivations, or institutional conditions, we are left with
the results that such conduct always violates the rights of the accused
and sometimes contributes to convicting the innocent.
No matter what causes prosecutorial errors, such as the use of false
snitch testimony and Brady violations, the head prosecutor in a
particular jurisdiction is in the best position to implement policies to
prevent these problems. More than the state legislature, the federal
government, or the United States Supreme Court, the head of a
particular prosecutor's office has the ability to create and, if
necessary, enforce polices that every prosecutor in that office must
follow. The following policies, some of which already exist in some
jurisdictions, are policies head prosecutors should implement to help
prevent the use of false snitch testimony and Brady violations.
1. Adopt a Prosecutor's Handbook for the Office
Prosecutors have extensive power, and often exercise discretion in
exercising this power, with few controls. Prosecutors decide whom to
prosecute, what crimes to charge, how much leniency to give
informants in exchange for information and testimony, sentence
recommendations for the accused, and the nature of plea-bargains, if
any, the accused may be offered. At each step, the individual
prosecutors involved make these decisions in secret, subject only to
the controls imposed by the head prosecutors in their offices. To
provide concrete guidance to prosecutors and to introduce some
transparency into how their offices work, head prosecutors should
implement the recommendations of well established criminal justice
standards and the National District Attorneys Association (NDAA)
and follow the example of the U.S. Department of Justice by adopting
prosecutor manuals for their offices.
The ABA Criminal Justice Standards on the Prosecution Function
(ABA Prosecution Function Standards) recommend that each
prosecutor's office adopt a "prosecutor's handbook" containing "a
statement of (i) general policies to guide the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion and (ii) procedures for the office. The objectives of these
policies as to discretion and procedures should be to achieve a fair,
65Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful
Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WISCONSIN L. REV. 399, 400.
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efficient, and effective enforcement of the criminal law., 66 The ABA
Prosecution Function Standards recommend that the public have
access to the handbook "except for subject matters declared
'confidential,' when it is reasonably believed that public access to
their contents would adversely affect the prosecution function. 67
The NDAA, the leading national organization for state
prosecutors, similarly recommends the creation of a written policy
manual for each office explaining: "The policies and procedures
should give guidance in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and
should provide information necessary for the performance of the
duties of the staff., 68 Similar to the ABA Criminal Justice Standards'
rationale, the NDAA states: "The objectives of these policies and
procedures are to establish the office as a place for the fair, efficient,
and effective enforcement of the criminal law." 69 The NDAA also
recommends that each prosecutor's manual "should be subject to
access by the general public and/or law enforcement agencies or the
defense bar.",
70
In addition to the recommendations of the ABA Criminal Justice
Standards and the NDAA, the U.S. Department of Justice has set a
national example by publishing the U.S. Attorney's Manual
(USAM),71 which is available to the public. The USAM sets out the
general principles for commencing or recommending federal
prosecution,72 and the USAM lists factors prosecutors should consider
in exercising discretion whether to prosecute.73 The USAM also
66 AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/
standards/pfunc-toc.html. The ABA issued the initial set of criminal justice standards in 1969,
and the ABA House of Delegates approved the third edition of the Standards in February, 1992.
Id. at xii.6
1 Id. at Standard 3-2.5(b).
68 NAT'L DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASS'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard
10.1 (2d ed. 1991), available at http;//www.ndaa.org/pdf/ndaa natlJprosecutionstandards.pdf.6 9 
id.
7 I1d. at Standard 10.3.
U' .S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL (2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia reading_roomn/usam/index.html.
72 The USAM states that a prosecutor "should commence or recommend Federal
prosecution if he/she believes that the person's conduct constitutes a Federal offense and that
the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction" unless
the prosecutor believes: "1. No substantial Federal purpose would be served by prosecution; 2.
The person is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or 3. There exists an
adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution." Id. at § 9-27.220(A).
73 The USAM lists the following seven factors for federal prosecutors to consider in
exercising discretion to pursue a prosecution:
(1) Federal law enforcement priorities;
(2) The nature and seriousness of the offense;
(3) The deterrent effect of prosecution;
(4) The person's culpability in connection with the offense;
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identifies impermissible considerations, which are: "1. The person's
race, religion, sex, national origin, or political association, activities,
or beliefs; 2. The attorney's own personal feelings concerning the
person, the person's associates, or the victim; or 3. The possible affect
of the decision on the attorney's own professional or personal
circumstances. 74
Despite the recommendations of the ABA Criminal Justice
Standards and the NDAA and the example of the U.S. Department of
Justice, relatively few of the more than 2300 prosecutors' offices that
pursue felony cases in state courts have manuals or written guidelines
for exercising discretion, and whatever manuals or guidelines that
may exist do not appear to be available to the public.75 The lack of
written policies for exercising discretion and the lack of transparency
in the process are breeding grounds for inconsistency and potential
arbitrariness in the way prosecutors in an office approach their work.
The head prosecutor of an office without a written manual or
guidelines for exercising discretion could help prevent the use of false
snitch testimony and Brady violations by creating written guidelines
covering these two areas and making those guidelines available to the
public. Such action would establish procedures in the office that are
clear and definite, and each prosecutor's actions pursuant to these
(5) The person's history with respect to criminal activity;
(6) The person's willingness to cooperate in the investigation or prosecution of
others; and,
(7) The probable sentence or other consequences if the person is convicted.
Id. at § 9-27.230(A). The USAM states that the list is "not intended to be all-inclusive," explains
each factor, and lists an additional eighth factor, which is "the person's personal circumstances."
Id. § 9-27.230(B).
14 Id. at § 9-27.260(A).
73 CAROL J. DEFRANCES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROSECUTORS IN STATE
COURTS, 2001, at 1 (2002), available at http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/abstract/psc0l.pdf. Available
data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics demonstrate that only nineteen percent of prosecutors'
offices have written guidelines for handling juvenile cases. Id. at 7. The survey did not provide
any other information on manuals or written guidelines. See generally id.
In my own experience practicing criminal law in several different cities and counties in
two states, I have never found a state or local prosecutor's office with a manual or written
guidelines addressing the exercise of discretion made available to the public. Prosecutors in
state courts routinely tell me that no such manual or written guidelines exist in their offices. It
appears that Minnesota is the only state with a law addressing this issue, and the law requires
every prosecutor's office to adopt "written guidelines governing the county attorney's charging
and plea negotiation policies and practices." MINN. STAT. § 338.051(3)(a) (1997). Minnesota
requires the guidelines to set out "the circumstances under which plea negotiation agreements
are permissible," "the factors that are considered in making charging decisions and formulating
plea agreements," and "the extent to which input from other persons concerned with a
prosecution, such as victims and law enforcement officers, is considered in formulating plea
agreements." Id. I have been unable to locate any other information concerning the number of
state and local prosecutors' offices that have manuals or written polices outlining the exercise of
discretion. More research and data in this area are needed.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
written procedures could be subject to internal review and, if
necessary, enforcement.
Although no one has done an in depth study into prosecutor
integrity, a Department of Justice's National Institute of Justice study
of police integrity found that a "culture of integrity, as defined by
clearly understood and implemented policies and rules, may be more
important in shaping the ethics.., than hiring the 'right' people. 76 In
addition, the study recommended that to enhance integrity two other
measures should be taken: "consistently address relatively minor
offenses with the appropriate discipline" so that one "may infer that
major offenses, too, are likely to be disciplined," and "disclose the
disciplinary process and resulting discipline to public scrutiny." 7
The findings concerning steps to enhance police integrity are
consistent with studies of lawyer ethics that demonstrate that the
ethical culture in a law office is critical to the ethical behavior of the
lawyers in that office. 78 This all points to the need for head
prosecutors to implement written policies that describe proper
conduct in dealing with informants, especially jailhouse snitches, and
Brady material, and to utilize internal discipline procedures when
those policies are violated. Without written policies, the prosecutors
making these decisions are left to determine, on their own, the proper
way of handling a situation, or must rely on the advice of others in
their offices who may have widely varying views of what is proper. In
the following sections, I will discuss specific policies head
prosecutors should consider implementing for dealing with informant,
especially snitch, testimony and Brady disclosures.
2. Impose Controls on the Use of Informant (Snitch) Testimony
A head prosecutor could prohibit the use of informant testimony,
especially jailhouse snitch testimony, altogether, but many
prosecutors might view that approach as too drastic a cure for the
problem of potential unreliability of informants. In some instances,
76 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, ENHANCING POLICE INTEGRITY, at ii (2005), available at
http;//www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/209269.pdf. The study involved a survey of 3235 police
officers from thirty different law enforcement agencies who responded to hypothetical questions
related to misconduct. Id. at 1.
71 Id. at 6.
78 See, e.g., JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY
BAR 167 (1966) ("The longer a lawyer has been a member of the office, and the more socially
cohesive the office, the more likely it is that his behavior will be in line with the attitudes of his
colleagues."); FRANCES KAHN ZEMANS & VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM, THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC
PROFESSION 173 (1981) ("[A]fter general upbringing, the source given the greatest credit for
learning professional responsibility is the 'observation of or advice from other attorneys in your
own law office."').
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the testimony of a jailhouse snitch may appear to be reliable and may
be important to prosecuting a defendant successfully. Instead of
banning the use of jailhouse informant testimony altogether, a more
balanced approach to the problem would consider reasonable
measures that could effectively address the reliability issue.
The reliability issue should be approached with clear guidelines
because the unreliability of informant testimony has been recognized
by courts and prosecutors-anyone remotely associated with the
criminal justice system recognizes that there are problems using
witnesses who trade testimony for leniency. 79 Nearly one hundred
years ago, the United States Supreme Court warned that the testimony
of accomplice informants should be viewed "with suspicion, and with
the very greatest care and caution, ' '80 and more than fifty years ago
the Court stated that "informers, accessories, accomplices, false
friends, or any of the other betrayals which are 'dirty business' may
" Judge Stephen Trott, a former prosecutor, used to train federal prosecutors about the
problems of using informant testimony, especially jailhouse snitch testimony. He later used his
training materials in writing a law review article in which he stated: "The most dangerous
informer of all is the jailhouse snitch who claims another prisoner confessed to him." Trott,
supra note 58, at 1394. Judge Trott currently sits on the Ninth Circuit, and in a decision he
authored he explained:
Never has it been more true than it is now that a criminal charged with a serious
crime understands that a fast and easy way out of trouble with the law is ... to cut a
deal at someone else's expense and to purchase leniency from the government by
offering testimony in return for immunity, or in return for reduced incarceration....
Commonwealth ofN. Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1123 (9th Cir. 2001).
Professor Bennett Gershman, a former prosecutor, has warned that a cooperating witness
not only has "extraordinary incentives to lie" but also has the "capacity to manipulate, mislead,
and deceive his investigative and prosecutorial handlers." Bennett L. Gershman, Witness
Coaching by Prosecutors, 23 CARODOZO L. REV. 829, 847 (2002). Despite these risks,
Gershman explains: "For the prosecutor, the cooperating witness provides the most damaging
evidence against a defendant, is capable of lying convincingly, and typically is believed by the
jury." Id.
The ABA's Ad Hoc Innocence Committee's report also notes that among the official
studies documenting "problems associated with the use of jailhouse informants" are "a grand
jury report," "two Canadian public inquiries," "numerous books, articles, and news reports."
ABA INNOCENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 24, at 63. A Los Angeles County Grand Jury
Report found that "prosecutors' and investigators' systematic misuse of jailhouse informants
leading to wrongful convictions in as many as 250 major felony prosecutions between 1979 and
1988." Barry Tarlow, Some Prosecutors Just Don't Get It: Improper Cross and Vouching,
CHAMPION, Dec. 28, 2004, at 55, 61 (citing to the report by the Los Angeles County Grand
Jury). The two major findings of the Los Angeles County Grand Jury were that the "Los
Angeles County District Attorney's Office failed to fulfill the ethics responsibilities required of
a public prosecutor by its deliberate and informed declination to take the action necessary to
curtail the misuse ofjailhouse informant testimony," and the "Los Angeles Sheriffs Department
failed to establish adequate procedures to control improper placement of inmates with the
foreseeable result that false claims of confessions or admissions would be made." REPORT OF
THE 1989-90 LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY: INVESTIGATION OF JAILHOUSE INFORMANTS
IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN Los ANGELES COUNTY 6 (1990).
'o Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 204 (1909).
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raise serious questions of credibility."8' More recently, Judge Stephen
Trott, a former prosecutor sitting on the Ninth Circuit, explained:
[E]ach contract for testimony is fraught with real peril that
the proffered testimony will not be truthful, but simply
factually contrived to "get" a target of sufficient interest to
induce concessions from the government. Defendants or
suspects with nothing to sell sometimes embark on a
methodical journey to manufacture evidence and to create
something of value, setting up and betraying friends,
relatives, and cellmates alike. Frequently, and because they
are aware of the low value of their credibility, criminals will
even go so far as to create corroboration for their lies by
recruiting others into the plot .... 82
Given the problems with credibility, head prosecutors should
ensure that their offices have clear guidelines controlling the use of
cooperating witnesses, especially jailhouse snitches. Perhaps the
single most important policy would be to require the corroboration of
jailhouse informant testimony, so that, as the ABA recommends, "no
person should lose liberty or life based solely on the testimony of
such a [jailhouse informant] witness.8 3 Some states currently require
corroboration for accomplice testimony, 4 and the same motivation of
a lighter sentence or other benefit that motivates an accomplice to
testify against the accused motivates jailhouse snitches.
If a head prosecutor is not willing to require corroboration of
jailhouse snitch testimony before using it against the accused, at the
very least the head prosecutor should put written guidelines in place
for how and when to use jailhouse informants. Psychology
experiments consistently demonstrate that "as a general rule people
are poor lie detectors."8 5 For example, one study showed that college
81 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757 (1952).
82 Commonwealth ofN. Mariana Islands, 243 F.3d at 1124.
83 ABA INNOCENCE COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 24, at 70. The ABA Resolution,
passed by the ABA House of Delegates, states: "RESOLVED, That the American Bar
Association urges federal, state, local, and territorial governments to reduce the risk of
convicting the innocent, while increasing the likelihood of convicting the guilty, by ensuring
that no prosecution should occur based solely upon uncorroborated jailhouse informant
testimony." Id. at 63.
84 The ABA Innocence Committee cites to several state statutes and notes that "[e]ighteen
states require corroboration of an accomplice's testimony." Id. at 70, n.22.
85 Saul M. Kassin, Human Judges of Truth, Deception, and Credibility: Confident but
Erroneous, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 809, 809 (2002). "Dozens of studies of the communication of
deception provide compelling evidence that people are not very skilled at distinguishing when
others are lying from when they are telling the truth. In experimental studies of detecting
deception, accuracy is typically only slightly better than chance." Bella M. DePaulo et al., The
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students had only a 52.8 percent accuracy rate in detecting true and
false stories, federal polygraph examiners were slightly better at 55.7
percent, robbery investigators had a 55.8 percent accuracy rate, trial
judges had a 56.7 percent accuracy rate, psychiatrists were at a 57.6
percent accuracy rate, and U.S. Secret Service agents did the best
with a 64 percent accuracy rate in detecting true and false stories.86
With the general human tendency to be only slightly better than
chance in sorting out truth from lies, and even trained law
enforcement personnel not doing much better, reasonable measures to
determine the reliability ofjailhouse informants are needed.
A head prosecutor who wants to establish procedures to
counterbalance the human inability to be good lie detectors should
use the ABA Ad Hoc Innocence Committee's Report list of factors,
developed by a Canadian commission report investigating the
wrongful conviction of Guy Paul Morin.87 Among these factors are
recommendations that the informant's statements be corroborated by
evidence other than the testimony of other informants, that the
statement contain "details or leads to the discovery of evidence
known only to the perpetrator," that the prosecutor consider the past
record of the informant in giving reliable testimony, whether the
informant's report of alleged statements made by the accused was
given immediately after the statement was made and given to more
than one officer, and the techniques used in obtaining the report of the
statement such as "use of non-leading questions, thorough report of
words spoken by the accused, thorough investigation of the
circumstances which might suggest opportunity or lack of opportunity
to fabricate a statement.,
88
In addition, police and prosecutors should videotape or audio
record all conversations with the jailhouse informant so that there is
the ability, after the fact, to determine if the witness has been coached
into inculpating the accused, or if the witness has manipulated the
police or prosecutor into disclosing details of the crime known only to
the victim, the real perpetrator, and involved law enforcement
Accuracy-Confidence Correlation in the Detection of Deception, 1 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. REv. 346, 346 (1997).
86 Paul Eknan & Maureen O'Sullivan, Who Can Catch a Liar?, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
913, 916 (1991). This study involved 509 people who were showed a videotape often people
who were either lying or telling the truth in describing their feelings. Id. at 913.
87 See ABA INNOCENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 24, at 67-69 (citing HON. FRED
KAUFMAN, THE COMMISSION ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING GUY PAUL MORIN (Ontario
Ministry of the Attorney General 1998)).
8 id.
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officials.8 9 A prosecutor not involved in the case should review these
recordings so that there is an internal check on reliability. If the
jailhouse informant is going to be used as a prosecution witness at
trial, the recordings should be turned over to the defense as part of
Brady disclosure for possible impeachment of the witness. 90
Finally, if an agreement is reached with a jailhouse snitch, all
promises and benefits to the witness should be in writing and subject
to full disclosure under Brady.91 The next section will discuss other
policies a head prosecutor should create with regard to Brady
disclosure obligations.
3. Create Clear Discovery Rules for the Prosecutor's Office
A head prosecutor can help avoid Brady violations by adopting
clearer disclosure rules than those required by the courts or state law.
As discussed previously, a prosecutor evaluating evidence for
disclosure to the defendant may be conflicted when determining what
is exculpatory pursuant to Brady.92 The standard for disclosure under
Brady has focused on the "materiality" of the evidence and requires
that the "evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the results of the
proceeding would have been different., 93 In exploring this standard,
the Supreme Court has ruled that even when the withheld evidence
creates a reasonable possibility of a different outcome if the
prosecution had turned over the evidence there is not a Brady
violation because the defendant fails to meet the burden of
establishing a reasonable probability of a different outcome.94 One
commentator explains "what 'material' means; under what
circumstances exculpatory evidence must be disclosed-by whom-
and when it must be disclosed; have been the subject of much
'9 Professor Bennett Gershman discusses the various ways prosecutors engage in witness
coaching, and how cooperating witnesses can deceive and manipulate police and prosecutors.
See Gershman, supra note 79, at 829-44, 847-50. Gershman notes however, that even with
documentation of the encounters with a cooperating witness there are some psychological
components such as "a witness's own 'suggestibility,' 'confabulation,' and 'memory
hardening,"' that may escape detection and still lead to false or misleading testimony. Id. at 852.
90 Contemporaneous records of interactions between the government and the jailhouse are
necessary "to ascertain the extent to which prosecutors or police may have improperly
influenced witnesses overtly, covertly, or even unwittingly to give false or misleading
testimony." Id. at 833.
9' The Supreme Court has held: "When the 'reliability of a given witness may well be
determinative of the guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls
within this [Brady] rule." Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 155 (1963).
92 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
93 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
9 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 291 (1999).
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confusion, revision, and debate among courts, lawyers, and
academics." 95 Rather than letting prosecutors in an office attempt to
assess disclosure under a confusing set of rules, a head prosecutor
should provide clearer guidance that ensures complete compliance
with Brady.
The surest way to meet and exceed Brady disclosure obligations is
to adopt an "open file" discovery policy-essentially making
available to the defense all of the information in the prosecutor's
possession. Many individual prosecutors have open file discovery
policies, 96 though this is generally left to the discretion of individual
prosecutors and is not an office-wide policy.97 This means that
without a policy requiring open file discovery in a particular office,
whether a defendant receives the benefit "of an open file policy may
depend on the particular prosecutor, the relationship between defense
counsel and the prosecutor, the identity of the defendant, and the
nature of the case.",98 Without guidelines on the exercise of discretion
in discovery, there is the potential for some prosecutors to use factors
such as the race or social standing of the defendant or the defendant's
lawyer in determining who receives open file discovery.
An open file discovery policy not only removes the guessing and
doubt on whether prosecutors in the office are following Brady, but a
head prosecutor who implements an open file discovery policy will
eliminate potential grounds for appeal and second guessing of the
judgment of prosecutors.99 An open file discovery policy also
removes the problem of a prosecutor trying to evaluate evidence
under the vague and indefinite standards of Brady.
95 Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New
Realities, 2006 WISCONSIN L. REV. 542, 564-65.
96 See, e.g., David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1729,
1738 (1993) (noting that some prosecutors have an "open file" discovery policy by choice); Lee
Sarokin & William E. Zuckerman, Presumed Innocent? Restrictions on Criminal Discovery in
Federal Courts Belie This Presumption, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 1089, 1107 (1991) (stating that
many prosecutors "choose to open their files to opposing counsel"). In my own experience
doing criminal defense, some prosecutors in local and state courts would open their files to me
by permitting me to review their files in their presence, while other prosecutors in the same
office would not.
97 See Tamara L. Graham, Death by Ambush: A Plea for Discovery of Evidence in
Aggravation, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 321, 342. n.170 (2005).
98 Prosser, supra note 95, at 593-94.
99 Provided the material in the prosecutor's file is complete and contains information
compiled by all of the law enforcement personnel related to the case, there cannot be any Brady
material not disclosed if the prosecutor has an open file discovery policy. And, a prosecutor with
open file discovery has an obligation to ensure that the materials in the file are complete and
accurate. See Robinson v. State, 879 S.W.2d 419, 421-22 (Ark. 994). When a prosecutor
employs open file discovery, there cannot be a Brady violation. See Martin v. State, 971 So.2d
736, 744 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).
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An open file discovery policy could also provide that if there is
anything in the file that the prosecutor believes is privileged or would
be embarrassing or intrusive into the privacy rights of a witness, the
prosecutor would provide notice to the defense attorney that certain
material, such as medical records of a potential witness, are being
withheld for privacy reasons. Such a claim by the prosecution would
shift the burden to the defense to seek a court order to obtain the
evidence. In some instances, a trial judge may engage in an ex ante, in
camera review to determine if the evidence in question is Brady
material rather than in an appellate post hoc evaluation of withheld
evidence on appeal.
If a head prosecutor is reluctant to implement an open file
discovery for an office, at the very least the head prosecutor could
create a policy that all exculpatory evidence be disclosed to the
defendant. As a result of a study of wrongful convictions in Illinois,
the Illinois Supreme Court adopted a rule that "the State shall disclose
to defense counsel any material or information within its possession
or control which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the
offense charged or which would tend to reduce his punishment
thereof."100 By adopting such a policy, a head prosecutor would
remove the confusion over the "materiality" component currently
present under Brady, and, like implementing an open file discovery
policy, should prevent Brady violations in the prosecutor's office.
In addition to whatever policy a head prosecutor implements
concerning disclosure obligations, the policy should require timely
disclosure of material when it will be most useful to the defense. This
means that disclosure of favorable material should take place prior to
plea bargains, as Professor McMunigal has argued.'0 ' For cases going
to trial, disclosure should take place weeks or at least days prior to
trial, instead of the first day of trial or during trial, as sometimes
occurs.
B. What Defense Attorneys Can Do
Defense attorneys also should do more to combat possible false
snitch testimony. For example, two former public defenders have
created "The Rat Manual," in which they outline steps to take when
dealing with informants, including jailhouse snitches.10 2 The manual
provides an excellent step-by-step approach to all aspects of dealing
'TIl. Sup. Ct. R. 412(c).
101 See McMunigal, supra note 43, at 745-47.
-see Charles M. Sevilla & Verna Wefald, Finding Evidence to Search for and
Undermine the Snitch (The Rat Manual) (1994) (on file with author).
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with informants and it provides case and statutory support for every
subject. The issues covered include early discovery of the informant's
identity and background, collecting impeachment information from
public records and investigation techniques, investigating the
prosecutor's conduct with the informant and other informants, filing
pretrial motions to exclude the informant as unreliable, implementing
a strategy to impeach the informant on cross-examination, using
expert witnesses for impeachment, drafting cautionary jury
instructions addressing the issue of credibility for snitch testimony,
and post conviction motions. 103
In a similar vein, some public defender offices have offered
training on dealing with informants and have made materials
available via the internet. The District of Columbia's Public Defender
Service (PDS) has posted materials from a program entitled "The
ABCs of Cross-Examining 'Cooperating' Witnesses."' 1 4 The PDS
training materials contain internet links to materials that include a
sample motion to preclude the creation of snitch testimony, a sample
motion to exclude cooperating witness testimony and a request for a
reliability hearing, and three sample cross-examinations.' 0 5 The
Florida Public Defender Conference presented a program entitled
"Snitches, Rats and Songbirds,"' 0 6 and the material for the
conference, available over the internet, includes suggestions for
introducing the issue of informant credibility during jury voir dire,
language for describing the snitch during closing, and a sample
cautionary letter to send to clients advising them not to speak to
anyone about their cases. 10 7 The materials demonstrate the variety of
approaches defense counsel should employ to prevent the creation of
and to combat false jailhouse snitch testimony.
If there is jailhouse snitch testimony, defense lawyers who seek to
exclude the informant's testimony will face obstacles. The criminal
justice system relies primarily on the availability of cross-
examination and jury instructions to address issues of reliability when
the government uses informants. 0 8 Yet, jailhouse snitches trading
103 See id.
'04 District of Columbia Public Defender Service, The ABCs of Cross-Examining the
"Cooperating" Witness, http://www.pdsdc.org/calendar/summerseries/ss06202006/
CrossExaminingCooperatingWitnesses-TableofContents.pdf (last visited March 1, 2007).
105 See id. The sample motion to preclude the creation of snitch testimony was created by
the Louisiana State Indigent Defense Assistance Board. See id.
'06 See id.
107 See id.
108In addressing the use of compensated informants, the Supreme Court reasoned that the
government does not violate a defendant's due process rights stating: "The established
safeguards of the Anglo-American legal system leave the veracity of a witness to be tested by
cross-examination, and the credibility of his testimony to be determined by a properly instructed
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testimony for leniency have significant incentives to fabricate
testimony because their own fate depends upon them presenting
credible and consistent testimony against the accused.' °9 Once a
jailhouse snitch formulates a story, the prosecutor handling the case
will very likely coach the informant to be consistent and
convincing. 0 This type of practiced testimony is especially resistant
to cross-examination, so defense lawyers must press the issue of
jailhouse informant unreliability through the types of investigations,
pretrial motions and hearings, and trial strategies, discussed in a
growing number of resources, to combat false snitch testimony.
Defense attorneys should also push trial courts to require
prosecutors to provide early and complete disclosure of exculpatory
evidence concerning the informant. In every case in which the
prosecutor designates a jailhouse informant as a witness, the defense
attorney should file a discovery motion that specifically asks for the
following: a complete criminal history of the informant; a list of all
cases in which the informant has testified or offered to testify against
another; whether the informant has ever recanted testimony or a
statement in the past and a copy of such recantation; the specific
statements of the defendant that the informant will testify about and
the time, place, and manner in which the statements were allegedly
made; all written or oral deals, promises, inducements, or benefits
made by the government to the informant or planned to be made by
the government, and any other information concerning the
informant's credibility."' If the trial judge requires this type of
jury." Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966).
'09 As one commentator explains:
Paradoxically, the more a witness's fate depends on the success of the prosecution,
the more resistant the witness will be to cross-examination. A witness whose future
depends on currying the government's favor will formulate a consistent and credible
story calculated to procure an agreement with the government and will adhere
religiously at trial to her prior statements.
George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. L.
REV. 1, 54 (2000).
'10See Gershman, supra note 79, at 834-38.
1 This recommendation is based on the following specific discovery required by the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals whenever the government uses an informant:
At least ten days before trial, the state is required to disclose in discovery: (i) the
complete criminal history of the informant; (2) any deal, promise, inducement, or
benefit that the offering party has made or may make in the future to the informant
(emphasis added); (3) the specific statements made by the defendant and the time,
place, and manner of their disclosure; (4) all other cases in which the informant
testified or offered statements against an individual but was not called, whether the
statements were admitted in the case, and whether the informant received any deal,
promise, inducement, or benefit in exchange for or subsequent to that testimony or
statement; (5) whether at any time the informant recanted that testimony or
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discovery, and if the prosecutor fully complies with such a discovery
order, the requirements of Brady will be met.
More detailed discovery motions, practice aids such as "The Rat
Manual," and the public defender training materials provide defense
attorneys with steps that they can take to preclude the creation of
snitch testimony, possibly exclude such testimony when it exists, and
creatively attack the testimony if it is introduced at trial. The
overarching message of these strategies is that defense lawyers should
be more proactive to attempt to combat the use of false snitch
testimony and to obtain compliance with Brady.
C. What Trial and Appellate Judges Can Do
Judges at the trial and appellate levels should also do more to
guard against the use of false snitch testimony and Brady violations.
The adversary system depends on trial judges monitoring the conduct
of prosecutors and defense lawyers in discovery, pretrial, and trial
proceedings. In reviewing cases, appellate judges should fashion
clearer legal rules to govern the disclosure obligations of prosecutors
and the conduct of trials.
A trial judge presented with a motion to exclude jailhouse
informant testimony should grant a reliability hearing on the matter
and appellate judges should approve of such hearings as within the
sound discretion of the trial judge. There are grounds for a trial judge
exercising such authority to ascertain the reliability and probative
value ofjailhouse snitch's testimony in both federal and state courts.
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide: "Preliminary questions
concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness . or the
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court .... In
addition, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide: "Hearings on the
admissibility of confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of the
hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be so
conducted [out of the hearing of the jury] when the interests of justice
require."'1 3 Most states, including Ohio, have adopted this same or
similar language.' 14 These evidentiary rules recognize a trial judge's
statement, and if so, a transcript or copy of such recantation; and (6) any other
information relevant to the informant's credibility.
Dodd v. State, 993 P.3d 778, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000).
12 FED. R. EVID. R. 104(a) (2006).
113 FED. R. EVID. R. 104(c) (2006).
114 The Ohio Rules of Evidence provide: "Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness ... shall be determined by the court ...." OHIO R.
EVIDENCE R. 104(A) (2006). The rules further state: "Hearings on the admissibility of
20071
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authority and obligation to conduct an admissibility hearing to
determine whether jailhouse snitch testimony of an alleged confession
by the accused did occur and is sufficiently reliable to be permitted at
trial against the accused. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 also provides
that "evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury."' 15
As discussed previously, courts have long recognized the
unreliability of informants," 6 and at least one court has stated that the
use of informant testimony is "creating the risk of sending innocent
persons to prison."' 17 In Dodd v. State, 18 the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals warned: "Courts should be exceedingly leery of
jailhouse informants, especially if there is a hint that the informant
received some sort of benefit for his or her testimony.""
9
Given the historical unreliability of jailhouse informants, some
judges have recommended or required reliability hearings when a
prosecutor plans to use the testimony of a jailhouse informant against
the accused. In a concurrence in Dodd v. State, one of the appellate
judges stated that "to ensure the utmost reliability in the admission of
jailhouse informant testimony, I would also mandate the reliability
hearing."'120 In D 'Agostino v. State,121 the Nevada Supreme Court held
that in the penalty phase of a capital case the "supposed admissions"
confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other
preliminary matters shall also be conducted out of the hearing of the jury when the interests of
justice require." Id. at R. 104(C). Some of the other states with the same or essentially same rule
of evidence include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See
ALA. R. EVID. R. 104 (2007); ALASKA R. EVID. R. 104 (2006); ARIZ. R. EVID. R. 104 (2007);
ARK. R. EVD. R. 104 (2006); COLO. R. EvlD. R. 104 (2007); DEL. R. EviD. R. 104 (2006);
IDAHO R. EVID. R. 104 (2006); IND. R. EVID. 104 (2006); IOWA R. EVID. R. 104 (2007); KY. RI
EVID. R. 104 (2006); ME. R. EviD. R. 104 (2006); MiCH. R. EVID. R. 104 (2007); MINN. R. EVID.
R. 104 (2005); MISS. R. EVID. R. 104 (2007); MONT. R. EviD. R. 104 (2005); N.H. R. EVID. R.
104 (2007); N.J. R. EVID. R. 104 (2007); N.M. R. EviD. R. 11-104 (2007); N.D. R. EvID. R. 104
(2007); 12 OKL. ST. § 2105 (2006); OR. REv. STAT. § 40.030, R. 104 (2006); R.I. R. EviD. ART 1,
R. 104 (2006); S.C. R. EVID. R. 104 (2006); S.D. CODIED LAWS § 19-9-9 (2006); TENN. R.
EVID. R. 104 (2006); TEx. R. EvrD. R. 104 (2007); UTAH R. EVID. R. 104 (2006); VT. R. EVID. R.
104 (2007); WASH. R. EVID. R. 104 (2006); W. VA. R. EVID. R. 104 (2006); WIS. STAT. § 901.04
(2006); WYo. R. EvID. R. 104 (2006).
11 FED. R. EVID. R. 403 (2006).16 See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
117 United States v. Bemal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th 1993).
"' Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 783 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000).
"
9 1d. at 783.
'
2 0 Id. at 784.
121 823 P.2d 283 (Nev. 1992).
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by a defendant "may not be heard by the jury unless the trial judge
first determines that the details of the admissions supply a sufficient
indicia of reliability or there is some credible evidence other than the
admission itself to justify the conclusion that the convict committed
the crimes which are the subject of the admission."122
As the foregoing discussion indicates, both the rules of evidence
and case authority provide support for the trial judge to exercise a
gate keeping function before admitting jailhouse informant
testimony. 23 When the record of a reliability hearing supports a
finding of unreliability, the trial judge should exclude the testimony
reasoning that the probative value of the testimony is outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused and that the testimony
may mislead the jury. A trial judge's decision on this preliminary
matter should be found to be within the judge's sound discretion, and
should not be disturbed on appeal unless the record demonstrates an
abuse of discretion.1
24
In addition to requiring reliability hearings before permitting
jailhouse informants to testify, trial and appellate judges can do more
to require more detailed discovery concerning jailhouse informants
and timely disclosure. Two models for more extensive discovery
when there are jailhouse informants are found in Oklahoma case
law 125 and in an Illinois statute. 26 Trial judges should impose such
1221d. at 285.
123 Professor George Harris has argued that the law's treatment of expert witnesses also
supports holding reliability hearings when a jailhouse informant is used. See Harris, supra note
109, at 1-5. Harris notes that jailhouse informants are compensated by one party, as are expert
witnesses, and this makes them more one-sided and violates the usual prohibition on paid
testimony. See id. Harris also contends that like experts, informants may appear to have special
knowledge of the crime that can sway the jury. See id. 54-56, 59-61. See also Daubert v.
Merrell Dow, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (requiring courts to hold reliability hearings before admitting
expert testimony).
124 See, e.g., Pina v. State, 38 S.W.3d 730, 736 (Tex. App. 2001) (holding that preliminary
questions concerning the admissibility of evidence are within the trial court's discretion).
125 See supra note I11.
126 Whenever the prosecution intends to use an informant to testify against the accused in a
death penalty cases, Illinois law requires the prosecutor to provide the following to the defense:
(1) the complete criminal history of the informant;
(2) any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit that the offering party has made or
will make in the future to the informant;
(3) the statements made by the accused;
(4) the time and place of the statements, the time and place of their disclosure to law
enforcement officials, and the names of all persons who were present when the
statements were made;
(5) whether at any time the informant recanted that testimony or statement and, if
so, the time and place of the recantation, the nature of the recantation, and the names
of the persons who were present at the recantation;
(6) other cases in which the informant testified, provided that the existence of such
testimony can be ascertained through reasonable inquiry and whether the informant
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requirements by instituting standing discovery orders in criminal
cases that require more detailed discovery concerning the background
of informants and possible impeachment material. If a trial judge is
reluctant to impose a standing order for more extensive and timely
discovery concerning informants, the trial judge should grant a
defense motion for more extensive discovery. 127 By enforcing a
standing discovery order or by granting a defense motion for more
extensive discovery concerning informants, the trial judge would help
to ensure complete and timely disclosure of all Brady material to the
defense.
Appellate judges can also take a more practical approach by
establishing more workable standards for Brady disclosures. Some
courts have held that the prosecutor has an obligation to disclose to
the defendant all favorable evidence "without regard to whether the
failure to disclose it likely would affect the outcome of the upcoming
trial.' 28 By separating the duty to disclose all favorable evidence
from the issues of materiality and the probability of reversal if the
material is withheld, these courts are sending a clearer message to
prosecutors that Brady disclosures must be complete. Some courts
also caution prosecutors that "[w]here doubt exists as to the
usefulness of the evidence to the defendant, the government must
received any promise, inducement, or benefit in exchange for or subsequent to that
testimony or statement; and,
(7) any other information relevant to the informant's credibility.
§ 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-21(c) (2007). The statute defines an informant as
"someone who is purporting to testify about admissions made to him or her by the accused
while incarcerated in a penal institution contemporaneously." Id. at 5/115-21 (a).
In addition, the prosecutor in a death penalty case must disclose to the defense the
following for every witness whose testimony the government plans to introduce:
(1) whether the witness has received or been promised anything,including pay,
immunity from prosecution, leniency in prosecution, or personal advantage, in
exchange for testimony;
(2) any other case in which the witness testified or offered statements against an
individual but was not called, and whether the statements were admitted in the case,
and whether the witness received any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit in
exchange for that testimony or statement; provided that the existence of such
testimony can be ascertained through reasonable inquiry;
(3) whether the witness has ever changed his or her testimony;
(4) the criminal history of the witness; and,
(5) any other evidence relevant to the credibility of the witness.
Id. at 5/115-22.
127 See supra note Ill and accompanying text for an example of the type information
about the informant that defense lawyers should seek in discovery.
128 United States v. Safavian, 233 F.R.D. 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2005); see also United States v.
Acosta, 357 F. Supp.2d 1228, 1233 (D. Nev. 2005).
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resolve all such doubts in favor of full disclosure."' 129 As the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals recently held:
In arguable cases, the prosecutor should provide the
potentially exculpatory information to the defense or, at the
very least, make it available to the trial court for in camera
inspection. Further, when the issue appears to be a close one,
the trial court should insist upon reviewing such material, and
should direct disclosure to the defense ....
When a defendant demonstrates on appeal that a prosecutor did not
turn over Brady material, state appellate courts should also consider
shifting the burden to the prosecution to show lack of prejudice to the
defendant. This approach was recently adopted by the Minnesota
Supreme Court for prosecutorial trial misconduct, 131 and at least two
other states require the government to demonstrate that prosecutorial
trial misconduct has not affected a defendant's rights.132 Although
these cases apply to trial misconduct, the reasoning is equally
applicable to pretrial disclosure obligations calculated to provide the
defendant access to favorable evidence for use at trial. As the
Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned, "placing the burden on the
prosecution to show lack of prejudice will allow for more effective
regulation of impermissible practices" and courts "retain the authority
in the appropriate case to reverse under our supervisory powers,
without regard to whether the defendant was prejudiced. ,1 By
shifting the burden to the prosecution to prove lack of prejudice when
the prosecution does not turn over favorable evidence to the
defendant, state appellate courts would encourage greater disclosure
and better safeguard the due process rights of the accused.
CONCLUSION
Reducing the incidence of false snitch testimony and Brady
violations is a shared responsibility of prosecutors, defense counsel,
and the judiciary. Rather than hoping and waiting for systemic change
to occur from above in the form of legislation or the possible
development of better case law by the United States Supreme Court to
129 United States v. Safavian, 233 F.R.D. at 17.
130 Boyd v. United States, 908 A.2d 39, 61 (D.C. Ct. App. 2007).
31 Minnesota v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006).
1
32 See Wilson v. State, 874 So.2d 1155, 1159 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (holding that state
must prove that prosecutorial misconduct did not affect defendant's substantial rights); State v.
King, 555 N.W.2d 189, 194 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that burden is on prosecution to
prove that plain error is harmless).
"
3 Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 303.
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protect against wrongful convictions, it is time for all who care about
wrongful convictions to do what is within their power to address the
causes of wrongful convictions. If even a handful of head prosecutors,
judges, and defense lawyers utilize some of the legal "self-help"
remedies outlined in this article, they will help prevent additional
wrongful convictions based on false snitch testimony and Brady
violations.
